Introduction

19
Concern about the depletion of the world's forests has led to many international calls for radical 20 efforts to reduce deforestation, including the United Nations Intergovernmental Forum on 21
Forests of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (1999) , and the World Commission 22 on Forests and Sustainable Development (1999) . This concern reflects an appreciation of the 23 ecological and economic functions of forests: as providers of timber and many non-timber 24 to play both as a partial cause of deforestation, and, if practised wisely, as a potential source of 5 salvation for at least some of the world's forests. In terms of its causal role, forestry tends to 6 open up primary forest areas, enabling colonists to move in, using roads forged by the timber 7 companies. In some parts of the world, forests are converted not to agriculture but to biomass 8 plantations of fast growing trees or to other agro-industries based on tree-crop plantations such 9 as palm oil and rubber. Here the primary agent is not the peasant, but the richer elements of local 10 and international society. 11
How, then, can the world's forests be used more wisely? It is this complex question that we seek 12 to answer in this paper. Some argue for outright protection, caricatured perhaps in the phrase 13 'fence and forget'. Others argue for 'sustainable forest management', and still others for systems 14 of forest management that rely on acceptance of an initial period of exploitation of valuable 15 species followed by outright protection. The issue, then, is the optimal use of forested land 1 , 16 which begs the question of what is meant by 'optimal'. This is addressed shortly. 17
Forested land may be retained as forest or it may be converted to non-forest uses such as 18 agriculture, grazing, urban expansion, or industrial tree crops. The first question, then, is under 19 what circumstances is it better to convert forest land to non-forest uses, and when not. 20 In terms of timber volumes, conventional timber harvesting may be sustainable or unsustainable. 1
But the connotation of conventional logging is that it is often unsustainable, i.e., not focused on 2 long-term timber supplies. Sustainable timber management (STM) therefore arises when a forest 3 management plan is fully implemented for timber and focuses on long-term non-declining flows 4 of timber. 5
Sustainable forest management embraces the view of the forest as yielding many different 6 products and providing many different ecological services. Sustainable forest management will 7 therefore produce an array of products and services that may or may not include timber. SFM 8 therefore relates to the multiple use of the forest. To a forester, the term 'management' could 9 relate to the management of resources, inventorying and yield calculation, and to silvicultural 10 practice (e.g. climber cutting), so that, on some definitions, SFM is already embodied in good 11 practice timber harvesting. Again, then, the terminology of SFM is not ideal but is retained here 12 to convey the idea of multi-product uses and with a focus on the longer term. 13 'Protection' is also ambiguous. For ardent environmentalists it almost certainly means the 14 maintenance of the structure and composition of the forest without change caused by human 15 intervention. For others it risks being confused with 'conservation' which is the proper 16 management of the forest for the sustained yield of some product(s), service(s), or some 17 combination of products and services. Again, foresters would argue that they have always been 18 in the business of conservation in this sense (as indicated by the traditional term of 19 'Conservator'). 'Protection' also conjures up the image of leaving a forest totally alone when, in 20 practice, some management of fire and invasive exotic species is still likely to be required to 21 conserve structure and composition. What is 'optimal' depends on the viewpoint of the economic agent making the decision to 2 convert forest land or to adopt a particular forestry regime. Hence we need to identify the 3
stakeholders. 4
From the standpoint of most logging companies a forest exists to be logged. In principle, a forest 5
will not be logged if it is unprofitable to do so, although it is perfectly feasible that loggers may 6 log land at a loss if subsidies prevail. If logging is profitable, the regime used will generally be 7 that which maximises profits, subject to any regulations on harvesting that may be in place. In 8 addition to obligations under relevant legislation, logging companies may voluntarily attenuate 9 maximum profits if they feel some obligation towards the environment. In some cases it would 10 appear that the most profitable regime is not employed. RIL might, for example, lower costs but 11 not be used, perhaps because of ignorance, fear that investments in training may not be 12 recouped, or other reasons that remain unclear (Putz et al., 2000) . 13
Forest owners include national and regional governments, local communities, indigenous 14 groups, individuals and companies not engaged in logging. They may have several motives 15 relating to the forest: as a supply of products including timber, as an environmental resource, as 16 a stewardship objective, and so on. 17
From the standpoint of forest dwellers a forest exists to provide an array of ecological and 18 economic functions ranging from timber, fuelwood and wildmeat, to protection against floods. 19 From the standpoint of poor agricultural colonists, forests exist for the land they provide for 20 timber, crops and livestock, mainly the latter two. Such colonists may nonetheless have complex 21 mixes of motives. For instance, Mourato (1999) showed that slash and burn cultivators in Peru 22 exhibit a strong concern for the conservation values of their forests. Nor is the image of colonists 23 From the standpoint of the conservationist the forest exists to provide ecological functions, 4 amenity and the provision of wellbeing to forest peoples. Motivations vary and may range from 5 a desire to make direct use of the forest (e.g., ecotourism) to a concern for the intrinsic rights of 6 biodiversity to exist. 7
From the standpoint of national governments, forests may serve any of the above functions 8 depending on the extent to which governments have the wellbeing of particular stakeholders at 9 heart. They may prefer: 10
• logging to preservation because it provides employment and tax income; 11
• conversion because it may yield higher returns than timber production; 12
• conversion and colonisation because of the need to 'establish' political frontiers and 13 accommodate migrants; 14
• conservation because of a concern for vulnerable indigenous groups, because of the 15 potential income from sustainable uses of the forest, because there are financial 16 inducements to conserve, or because they have forest protection as a general social 17
objective. 18
From the standpoint of the world as a whole there may be a preference to log forests for the 19 valuable timber they contain, or to conserve forests for their local and global ecological 20 functions. In the latter case, there may be a preference to conserve forests because of their role in 21 providing biodiversity and in storing carbon that would otherwise be released to the atmosphere, 22 The viewpoints of the stakeholders necessarily conflict; otherwise there would be no problem. 4 Different uses of forested land are often incompatible. The only options for 'resolving' these 5
conflicts of values are: 6 (1) to impose a given use on all stakeholders, regardless of the differences of viewpoint. 7
This 'solution' is potentially unstable because one or more stakeholders will lose from 8 the imposed land use. Hence they have a continuing incentive to break the agreement by 9 securing its subsequent rejection, or by 'illegally' using the forest for their own purposes. 10 (2) to find an agreement which adopts a given use of the forest land and in which those who 11 lose are compensated in some way for forgoing their use of the land. On this solution, all 12 stakeholders are (ideally) better off with the agreed land use than they were without it. 13
The second solution suggests the meaning of 'optimal': it is a land use which is judged socially 14 the most beneficial overall, but in which those who lose from the land use are compensated for 15 their losses. This definition accords with elementary game theory (for a brief introduction see 16 Perman et al., 1999). 17
In practice, actual compensation for losses is often not feasible. At the very least then, forest 18 land should be allocated to those uses that maximise, as far as possible, the aggregate social 19 value of the forest land. If gains and losses are measured in monetary terms, then this 20 requirement is equivalent to a standard cost-benefit analysis approach and the compensation is 21 potential rather than actual. Put another way, gainers have to be able to compensate losers and 22 still have net gains to show (Pearce, 1986) . In practice, while we may not be able to assign 23 economic values to all functions, the cost-benefit approach is a reasonable way of organising the 1 framework for analysis. 2 A convenient language to describe stakeholders' interests is that of 'private' and 'social' gains 3 and losses. 'Private' refers to the private interests of the stakeholder, i.e., what benefits him or 4 her. 'Social' takes the wider, social perspective and the jurisdiction may be local, national, 5 regional or global. In theory, governments or global agencies should take the social standpoint, 6
but it is well known that this is not always the case. Both perspectives are relevant to 7 determining 'optimal' forest land use because adopting a social perspective without 8 acknowledging that some stakeholders' private interests may be compromised will, as noted 9 above, be potentially unstable. 10 The Meaning of Sustainable Forest Management
11
Optimal land use is not necessarily the same thing as sustainable land use (Toman and Ashton, 12 1994; Pearce, 1999 (1) sustainable timber management (STM) in which the focus is on a sustained yield of 1 timber over long time periods; and 2 (2) sustainable forest management (SFM) in which the focus is on the many products and 3 services of the forest sustained over long periods of time. 4 While it is generally thought that STM is consistent with SFM, it is at least open to argument 5 that STM may not maintain all the components of biodiversity, including ecosystem and 6 landscape-level structures and processes Putz et al., 2000) . Thus, it is important to distinguish 7 STM from SFM. In sustainable timber management, timber is extracted with regard to a 8 continuous future supply of wood through investment in regeneration. STM also tends to be 9 associated with minimisation of damage to residual stands (see Vanclay, 1996a,b) , possible 10 investment in finding uses for currently non-merchantable species, and accelerated growth of 11 merchantable species in managed stands. 12
Many writers have offered definitions of SFM (e.g., Dickinson et al., 1996; Reid and Rice, 13 1997; IFF, 1999), but perhaps the most complete definition comes from Bruenig (1996) : '… 14 management should aim at forest structures which keep the rainforest ecosystems as robust, 15 elastic, versatile, adaptable, resistant, resilient and tolerant as possible; canopy openings should 16 be kept within the limits of natural gap formation; stand and soil damage must be minimised; 17 felling cycles must be sufficiently long and tree marking so designed that a selection forestry 18 canopy structure and a self regulating stand table are maintained without, or with very little, 19 silvicultural manipulation; production of timber should aim for high quality and versatility … 20
The basic principle is to mimic nature as closely as possible to make profitable use of the natural 21 ecosystem dynamics and adaptability, and reduce costs and risks …'. The Context for the Analysis
1
The context for this paper is one where the starting point is an existing forest. Thus, we do not 2 discuss the optimal use of bare or degraded land. Additionally, although land uses that involve 3 conversion of the forest are relevant to the analysis, they are incidental to the main focus which 4 is on the appropriate form of forestry. It may or may not be the case that land conversion is 5 socially or privately 'better' than a given forestry use. Finally, outright protection is also relevant 6 to the analysis but is not the main focus. Like conversion, protection has to be part of the 7 analysis because forest practices are capable of being a precursor to a protected area 8 classification. Conventional logging, for example, is frequently a precursor to agricultural 9 colonisation, and hence to land conversion. One current argument is that protection might follow 10 on from an initial period of logging. 11
The Private Interests of the Logging Companies
12
The empirical evidence 13
From the logging firm's point of view, the use of the forest will be dictated by the option 14 providing the largest private financial rate of return. Empirical evidence relating to these rates of 15 return is limited (but see Pearce et al., 2000) . A particular problem concerns the fact that STM 16 and SFM systems have rarely been in place long enough for an accurate picture on financial 17 returns to be obtained (Dickinson et al., 1996) . STM is potentially profitable at 'reasonable' discount rates of 5-10% (in real terms), and 3 (2) STM is almost systematically less profitable than 'liquidation' forestry and other forms 4 of conventional logging. 5
These conclusions echo those already reached by other commentators, e.g., Bach and Gram 6 (1996) . Nonetheless, while this inequality of profitability explains the widespread preference of 7 loggers for CL, it does not justify it. The reason for this, as indicated previously, is that the 8 financial cost benefit calculation of the logger is not the same as that for society generally and 9
certainly not for the world as a whole. 10
Factors that could favour the financial profitability of STM 11
Advocates of STM have drawn attention to four main factors that might increase the financial 12 return to STM relative to CL: discount rates, future price increases, incremental growth rates for 13 timber volume, and property rights. 14 The discount rate 15 One 'price' of potential importance for the SFM versus CL debate is the discount rate. For the 16 financial perspective the relevant discount rate is that of the logger or concessionaire. For the 17 national perspective, the relevant rate is the social discount rate. The two rates can be expected 18 to differ, with the social rate being below the private rate (Pearce, 1986) . Surprisingly little is 19 known about discount rates in developing countries, but they tend to be so high that it is difficult 20 to justify even the most conventional of development projects (Pearce et al., 2000) . In the 21 context of forestry they are effectively fatal for any investment with a long-term focus.
While high personal discount rates appear to be the norm on the basis of the empirical evidence, 1 it is important to stress that few studies exist that adopt rigorous methodologies for estimating 2 those discount rates. Additionally, some poor communities do manage timber production on a 3 non-exploitative basis, suggesting that communal discount rates may be markedly less than 4 purely personal rates (see Pinedo-Vazquez and Rabelo, 1999). 5
Timber prices 6 If timber prices are expected to appreciate then there is some benefit to curtailing the harvest 7 now in favour of the future (effectively, price increases can be thought of as a deduction from 8 the discount rate). But future timber prices are unlikely to grow rapidly. Some of the high price 9 increases simulated in the STM studies, e.g., Howard and Valerio (1996) , are based on protected 10 forest industries. World prices are a better guide. Moreover, world price ('border prices') would 11 be the relevant magnitude in economic, as opposed to financial, studies. estimates of long-term trends (e.g., see Brooks et al., 1996) . Overall, it seems unlikely that future 17 price increases will confer significant advantages on STM relative to CL. More generally, as 18 long as timber is 'abundant', stumpage prices will be low, making STM financially vulnerable 19 (Southgate, 1998 shaped curve relative to stand condition (low at poor states and low again if there is high density 4 and crowding, although the latter is rare in managed natural forests) -see Vanclay (1994a) . 5 Second, large trees may have small percentage growth rates but substantial incremental yields in 6 terms of cubic metres of wood. Third, account has to be taken of damage in CL to residual trees 7 (10-40 cm dbh) that will form the next crop in polycyclic management operations. Surviving 8 damaged trees grow slowly and will not contribute to the next commercial crop due to stem 9 defects. Most of the growth benefit from RIL and STM derives from higher stocking and fewer 10 weed-dominated areas, such as vine blankets. Overall, STM could easily result in volume 11 increments of commercial species that are 2-4 times higher than after CL. 12
Property rights
13
It is widely argued that insecure or short-term property rights encourage CL, so that longer-term 14 rights would encourage a switch to SFM, or at least STM. accept the argument 15 in principle but argue that longer-term concessions would not alter the underlying financial costs 16 and benefits, favouring CL. But tenure might also encourage better environmental choices of 17 equipment and the training of staff, or at least enable better choices to be made. Boscolo and 18 Vincent (1998) simulate the effects of longer-term concessions on the timing of harvests in 19 Malaysia and show that, in their model, it would make no difference. Generally, it does not pay 20 to leave trees standing. Probably the best way to accommodate the concession length issue is to 21 regard longer concessions as an enabling device for STM, which, without additional incentives 22 such as performance bonds, will nonetheless be unlikely to lead to STM. improvements and why don't they adopt them automatically? Part of the problem seems to be 7 that critics are damning STM as it has been practised. Defenders of STM and SFM are saying 8 that past systems were poorly implemented, e.g., by excessive canopy opening, inappropriate log 9 transport, inappropriate machinery, lack of training and planning, etc. In other words, we need to 10 know what would constitute an efficient system. 11
Efficient STM or SFM may be difficult to attain, since efficiency implies an agreed objective 12 and the reality is that no such consensus exists. Objectives might, for example, embrace 13 recreating the original stand, regenerating harvested species, conserving 'habitat' trees, 14 minimising gaps, and so on. The reality seems to be that SFM is itself an 'elastic' concept, 15 making the criticism that it has not been practised when it should have been, difficult to 16 evaluate. 17 Valorising non-commercial timber species insecurity that it engenders. The effect of lack of security will be to reduce confidence in the 7 future and hence to favour short-run exploitation. The effect is the same as that of a high 8 discount rate. 9
The National Perspective
10
The national perspective on land use options differs from the financial analysis outlined above in 11 several ways. First, logging may not be the 'best' use of the forest land, so that there may be 12 broader options. Second, attention now has to be paid to the sequencing of land use. One 13 possibility is that logging is followed be either protection or conversion (and to which we might 14 add abandonment). Which one follows will determine the flow of costs and benefits to the 15 nation. Third, financial gains and losses should no longer be as relevant as economic gains and 16 losses, i.e. financial flows should be shadow priced. Fourth, all forest values other than timber 17 values become relevant. Fifth, if global values exist and can be converted to resource flows of 18 benefit to the nation, then they too become relevant. We address each modification in turn. 19
Widening the options to all forest land uses 20
In practice there will be combinations of uses that should also be considered, e.g. agroforestry, 21
clearance for plantation forestry, oil palm, etc. But the principle is the same; whereas a private 22 for agriculture and taking timber may be an ancillary operation aimed at helping recover the 7 costs of conversion. Repetto (1990) is of the view that most deforestation arises from the initial 8 action of logging which creates access to hitherto inaccessible forest land. In their review of 9 econometric studies of deforestation Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) find that deforestation is 10 higher when land is accessible, when timber and agricultural prices are high (encouraging 11 logging and conversion), when rural wages are low, and when there are opportunities for long 12 distance trade. Of these factors, several -accessibility, timber prices, and trade potential -all 13 relate to logging. Southgate (1998) documents cases where most road construction in forested 14 areas has come from loggers, encouraging conversion to cropland and pasture. Low stumpage 15 prices might contribute to conversion because even the modest rates of return that might be 16 expected from agriculture compare favourably to forestry at low stumpage prices. 17
This picture contrasts with the one suggested by some analysts who argue that CL could be 18 they have high discount rates, also making future yields unattractive. 1
The land is therefore potentially available for protection without the further threat of logging. 2
The argument has some force, but there are several problems. 3
First, the picture of loggers entering an area only once is often not accurate. Loggers often return 4 5-10 years after the first harvest to harvest trees that have become commercially valuable 5 because of changes in transport infrastructure, in milling methods, and market potential. Re-6 entry loggers may also be different people to the first-time entrant: smaller operators with lower 7 operating costs acting as agents for small mills working in formerly high-graded areas. The 8 'protect after logging' scenario thus has to relate to a context in which the threat of subsequent 9 logging intervention remains. 10 Second, even if the threat of further logging is removed, the threat of colonisation for non-timber 11 purposes is not removed and, indeed, is, ex hypothesi, more likely. Colonisation may be for 12 subsistence agriculture but also for agro-industrial use such as oil palm. Additionally, the because there was low population pressure on available land is unclear. Indeed, it is hard to 1 envisage many circumstances in which there will be limited pressures to convert the land. The 2 choice is not between 'logging followed by protection' and SFM/STM, but between some form 3 of continuous forestry and land conversion. The potential for logging to be followed by 4 protection may therefore be smaller than some of the literature acknowledges, although Reid and 5 accept that STM will be best suited to areas where there are strong pressures to 6 colonise the forest for conversion. And, of course, protection is costly and in no way avoids the 7 need for continued management. 8
One other form of sequencing has strong arguments in its favour. Here the aim would be to meet 9 timber demand from plantations, leaving natural forests to be managed mostly for non-timber 10 purposes. The sequence is then to afforest rapidly to establish plantations on degraded lands, 11 accepting some loss of natural forest in the interim, then protecting the remaining natural forest 12 whilst meeting demand for timber from plantations. Hunter (1998) Again, it needs to be recalled that protection is not costless. Not only are there continuing 1 management costs, but there are capital costs of fencing and establishing management 2 institutions. To these must be added the value of the protected land in uses forgone. 3
Shadow pricing private costs and benefits 4
The analyses of costs and benefits to loggers have typically all been in terms of financial rather 5 than economic flows. Exceptions are the World Bank studies reported by Grut (1990) . 6
Allowing for non-timber values 7
The recognition of non-timber values alters the focus of analysis from STM to SFM. In 8 economic language, the relevant measure is now total economic value (TEV) from the different 9 possible land uses. TEV comprises use and non-use values and both are capable of expression in 10 monetary terms by estimating the relevant willingness to pay (WTP) for those functions (Pearce, 11 1993; . The basic argument is that, even if STM is 'worse' than CL in financial terms, if 12 the WTP for the incremental non-timber benefits of SFM exceeds the financial deficit, SFM will 13 be preferred from a national perspective. More formally, 14
Where 'ntv' is non-timber values and Π is profit. 16 Contrary to Bawa and Seidel's (1998) contention that there is no experience of timber regimes 17 that integrate NTPs into the management system, Romero (1999) found that RIL had no effect 18 on the available biomass of epiphytic bryophyes that are harvested and sold by local people in 19 Costa Rica. Similarly, Salick (1995) found that non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and natural 20 forest management for timber were compatible in Nicaragua. In small-scale natural forests, 21 integration of NTFPs with timber is more the rule than the exception (see Pinedo-Vazquez and 22 The evidence on environmental impacts of logging regimes 3 The presumption in inequality [1] above is that environmental benefits under STM/SFM exceed 4 those under CL. This has been challenged by Rice et al. (1997; 1998a; 1998b) . They argue that 5 the physical effects of CL on the forest were relatively mild for the case they studied in lowland 6
Bolivia. However, that case relates to extremely low intensity mahogany harvesting, and it 7 would be hard to envisage that it would also hold for the much more intensive harvesting 8 characteristic of the eastern Amazon, or the dipterocarp forest of southeast Asia. Rice et al. 9
(1998) and Reid and Rice (1997) argue that STM/SFM can be just as destructive of the total 10 forest as CL, a view supported by Bawa and Seidler (1998) . Uncontrolled logging, it is argued, 11 may be comparatively benign, especially on flat lands that are logged when soils are dry and 12
where there is a low density of commercially exploitable species. However, under less 13 favourable conditions, CL may be very destructive. 14 STM can also be destructive, especially in the short-term, if it involves major canopy clearance 15 in an effort to encourage regeneration of light demanding species, but much depends here on the 16 management system in place. The Malayan Uniform System (Manokaran, 1998; Ashton and 17 Peters, 1999) removed most of the canopy, but successfully regenerated the basal area of 18 primary forest. Manokaran (1998) described the effects of selective logging during the 1950s at 19 Pasoh, Malaysia, and observed that by the mid 1990s the regenerated forest was well stocked 20 with commercially valuable dipterocarp species, unlike the less successful selective management 21 system practised in the hill dipterocarp forests. In contrast, the selective logging practised in 22
Queensland caused relatively little disturbance and was successful in providing a viable harvest 23 and maintaining the forest (Vanclay, 1994b; 1996b) . logging has taken place. They suggest that even CL followed by protection is superior to 1 STM/SFM because the former halts the process of forest domestication. But this is a double-2 edged argument, for CL could just as easily result in the loss of species dependent on large 3 canopy openings. Certainly, CL stands are especially prone to weed infestations due to excessive 4 damage and lack of pre-or post-logging treatments to discourage weeds and encourage potential 5 crop trees. Even though it does not constitute STM or SFM, reduced impact logging (RIL) 6 would be a substantial step in the right direction. Thus, pre-felling vine cutting can substantially 7 reduce post-logging incidence of serious vine infestations, and also reduce logging damage 8 where vines tie together tree crowns. RIL thus constitutes a major step forward. 9
Additionally, there has been a tendency to generalise from single localities and case studies. The 10 work of Rice et al. relies heavily on observations in the dry forests of northern Bolivia where, if 11 sustainable timber exploitation for the species currently harvested is to be practised, substantial 12 canopy manipulation is required in order to provide the conditions for the regeneration of light-13 demanding species, especially Swietenia macrophylla. The structure and composition of the 14 forest would thus have to change in a substantial way to avoid loss of the canopy species 15 currently most valuable. Even for these forests, it is unclear that species loss due to management 16 need be significant. These forests have survived major disturbances in the past, and proper 17 zoning of the forest should ensure biodiversity is retained. 18
Not all commercially valuable timber tree species require substantial canopy disturbance for 19 regeneration. In southeast Asian dipterocarp forests, for example, minimising damage to residual 20 stands is important to protect the abundant advanced regeneration of commercial species present 21 before harvesting and to reduce the likelihood of vine infestation once the canopy is opened. America are also negatively affected by the substantial canopy openings required to regenerate 1 mahogany in northern Bolivia. 2 Thus, it is not possible to say that STM systems necessarily result in less biodiversity than CL 3 systems. Without careful management, they may do so. If one of the aims is to conserve 4 biodiversity, then management systems should be capable of achieving that aim. In doing so, it 5 may well be the case that the financial returns to STM fall since there will often be a trade-off 6 between biodiversity objectives and maximum financial return. Given that biodiversity 7 conservation figures prominently in Forest Stewardship Council certification, any price or 8 marketing gains from certification will also reduce the profit differential between CL and SFM. 9
An interesting study by Stephens (1999) If forests were managed according to their mixed timber and carbon value, as opposed to their 1 timber value alone, significant changes would need to occur in management practices. Standing 2 volumes and rotation ages would need to be increased, and there would need to be substantial 3 increases in investment in silviculture. Leakage issues would loom large under such a scenario, 4
given the large and growing international demand for paper and other wood fibre products. With 5 long rotations, natural forest succession would occur which, in some cases, would reduce the 6 attractiveness of forests for early successional species of plants and animals, as well as for 7 recreation, so some of the 'carbon gains' would be offset by other factors. Despite these 8 misgivings, the clear implication is that the attachment of economic values to carbon via trading 9 and/or meeting domestic emission reduction targets could substantially favour better managed 10
forests. However, a more sceptical view is offered by Smith et al. (1999b) . Willingness to pay for certified timber Crossley and Points (1998) suggest that certified products are securing premia of 5-15% in some 3 cases, but that the real benefits of certification for industry lie in securing greater market share 4 and longer-term contracts. There is some evidence that companies gaining certification secure 5 higher company value, i.e. the value of certification shows up in share prices on the stock 6 exchanges. 7
If we take the range 5-15% as a likely measure of premium, the argument in Gullison (1995 ) 8 and Rice et al. (1997) is that this is far from sufficient to compensate for the additional 9 profitability of CL over SFM. But their argument is suspect, as a typical ratio of financial profits 10 for CL relative to STM would be, say, 1.5. For STM to become competitive it is not necessary 11 for prices to rise by 50%. A hypothetical numerical example shows that the price premium need 12 only be a fraction of the difference in profits between CL and STM. If costs of CL are 75 and 13 those for STM are 100, but both face the same market price of 150, then the ratio is 75/50 = 1.5. 14 The net price premium that will make profits equal is given by 15 p* = (C ST -C CL) /P 16 where P is the common log price. In the numerical example, p* = 17% (25/150), which is 17 considerably different to 50%. It is true that this premium is gross of certification costs, so that 18 the true price premium required for parity between profits in the two regimes is higher than 19
17%. 20
Willingness to pay for non-timber products and services Lampietti and Dixon (1995), Southgate (1996) , Chomitz and Kumari (1996) , Pearce (1998) , and 9
Pearce et al. (1999) . There are of course substantial difficulties in reaching general conclusions 10 from WTP studies, primarily because appropriate guidelines for carrying out such studies, such 11 as those set out in Godoy et al. (1993) and Godoy and Lubowski (1992) have not been followed. 12 The result has been a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate valuation procedures. The types of 13 mistake made have included generalisation from studies of a small area of forest to wider areas, 14 with little regard for (a) the fact that the area in question will not be typical of the whole forest 15 area simply because of variations in distance to market, and (b) ignoring the fact that, in a 16 hypothetical world where the whole forest was exploited for non-timber products, the prices, and 17 hence the profitability, of non-timber production would fall. Another methodological issue is the 18 extent to which values are based on maximum sustainable yield or on actual harvests, which are It is clearly hazardous to try to find some kind of consensus from the estimates of Pearce et al. 3 (2000) . Table 1 reports indicative annual values, but care needs to be taken in generalising any 4 of these numbers . Whichever way the analysis is done, the major role of 5 carbon values is revealed. Should, for some reason, global warming not remain a serious issue of 6 concern, then tropical forests might be found to have measured environmental value of around 7 $100/ha, far from enough to justify outright protection on economic grounds. 8 Table 1 . Indicative values of forest land for non-timber uses.. One of the few studies that attempts to place an economic value on the differential flows of 11 goods and services from CL and SFM is Kumari (1995; for the peat swamp forests of 12
North Selangor in Malaysia. The analysis relates to the differential benefits of moving from an 13 existing unsustainable timber management system, based on Malaysian Stateland forest practice, 14 to sustained forest management. The sustainable systems are markedly better than the 15 unsustainable system, showing a 13% improvement on CL. Although there is a decline in timber 16 revenues, non-timber (mainly agro-hydrological and rattan) and global benefits (carbon and 17 conservation of endangered species) increase more than enough to offset the losses. It is of 18 course, open to question whether this analysis is typical for forests generally. Importantly, the 19 global benefits will not accrue to forest owners or concessionaires without institutional change 20 analysis provides the 'demonstration' phase, but not the capture phase of the analysis, as she 3 herself notes. Nonetheless, Kumari's approach, which is essentially traditional incremental cost-4 benefit analysis, is the correct one and is likely to be the only one that can capture all the 5 relevant changes in the multiple outputs of different forest management regimes. 6 Smith et al. (1999a; see also Mourato, 1999 ) conducted a contingent valuation study of slash-7
and-burn farmers in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon. They sought the farmers ' 8 willingness to accept compensation simultaneously to conserve part of the forest outright and to 9 switch to multistrata agroforestry for the rest of the forest. Farmers were first asked their 10 willingness to accept (WTA) compensation (from electric utilities engaged in carbon offset 11 projects) for the combined preservation/agroforestry package, and were then asked by how 12 much they would discount the stated WTA to secure access to the environmental services of the 13 conserved part of the land. The difference between the two WTA measures gives a willingness 14 to pay measure (i.e., in terms of forgone compensation) for the environmental services. The 15 results were, in average terms: 16
• $218 compensation required for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be converted to 17 outright preservation; 18
• $138 compensation for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be converted to 19 agroforestry; 20
• $67 willingness to pay for environmental services for forest preservation 21
• $41 willingness to pay for environmental services for agroforestry.
